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James South
Aspects of Intentionality 
in Two 16th Century Aristotelians
The inheritance of the medieval notion of intentionality, especially as it was 
presented in Thomas Aquinas, is a complicated story. In what follows, I want 
to trace out and assess a key component of the discussion of intentionality in 
two sixteenth century thinkers and then think about some of the consequences 
of this inheritance. The two thinkers I will focus on emerge from two tradi­
tions that are rarely brought together in direct comparison, the later scholas­
ticism that shaped the thought of Francisco Suárez1 and the return to the text 
of Aristotle that emreged in the so-called Paduan School of Aristotelianism, 
exemplified here by Jacopo Zabarella2. The common thread that links both 
thinkers is that they both explicitly reject Thomas’s account of intentionality 
and try to improve on it, although each strikes out on his own from differ­
ent foundations. In doing so, I think they map out the main approaches that 
16th century Aristotelians took to the question of intentionality, whether in the 
Scholastic or Paduan traditions.
1 The standard biography of Suárez is R. Scorraile, François Suárez de a Compagnie de 
Jesus, 2 vols., Paris 1911. More recent discussions include J.J.E. Gracia, «Francisco Suárez: 
The Man in History», The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1991) 259-66; C. 
Noreña, «Suárez and the Jesuits», American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1991) 267- 
86. For overviews of Suárez’s influence, see J. Irriarte, «La proyección sobre Europa de un 
gran metafísica, o Suárez en la filosofía en los días del Barroco», Razón y Fe, número extraor­
dinario (1948) 229-265; J.-F. Courtine, Suárez et le systèm de la métaphysique, Paris 1991, 
405-418; J.P. Doyle, «Suárez - The Man, His Work and His Influence», in Francisco Suárez, 
Disputation LIV, trans. John P. Doyle, Milwaukee 1995,1-15; V. Salas - R. Fastiggi, «Francis­
co Suárez, the Man and His Work», in V. Salas - M. Fastiggi, ed., A Companion to Francisco 
Suárez, Leiden 2015, 1-28.
2 For Zabarella’s life and writings, see W.F. Edwards, The Logic of Jacopo Zabarella (1533- 
1589), Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University 1960, 1-82; C. Lohr, Latin Aristotle 
Commentaries II. Renaissance Authors, Firenze 1988, 497-503; A. Poppi, La dottrina della 
scienza in Giacomo Zabarella, Saggi e Testi 12, Firenze 1972, 15-24.
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To narrow the topic, I shall begin with some basic definitions. Victor Casten 
has nicely summarized the two questions any theory of intentionality must 
address3. One question, a more general question, concerns that which makes 
a mental state intentional, that is, what provides the content of a mental state. 
The second, and more particular question, concerns that which makes a given 
mental state have the content it happens to possess. That, of course, is a much 
more difficult question since there is no good reason to think that there is only 
one way to answer the question. Most obviously, in many medieval answers to 
this question we would have to talk about what makes sensation intentional in 
very different ways from what makes intellection intentional - after all, sensa­
tion is an organic operation while intellection is a wholly immaterial one. In 
this essay, I restrict myself to the first, more general question: what provides 
the content of a mental state? Of course, Aristotelians in the 16th century did 
not discuss the issue in exactly these terms. Instead, they framed the question 
in terms of efficient causality. What cause or set of causes is sufficient to pro­
duce an act of cognition having intentional content? Since the answer to this 
question can vary depending on whether we talk about sensory or intellectual 
cognition, I shall further restrict my remarks to sensation. However, it is worth 
pointing out that one notable feature that both thinkers considered here bring 
to the debate is a desire to minimize the dis-analogies between sensory cog­
nition and intellectual cognition, and they try to lay out accounts of sensation 
that are at least structurally similar to their accounts of intellectual cognition. 
Restricting myself to sensation permits me to start with a common assumption 
that both, indeed almost all, 16th century authors share, namely, that sensible 
species are required for sensory cognition. The divergences in theories follow 
from the different accounts that can be given of the relationship between the 
sensible species and sensory cognition.
There are four main answers to this question given in the sixteenth century. 
One, positing a distinct sensory power, an agent sense, that makes sensible 
species actually sensible, is outside the scope of this paper. However, it is 
important to note that most accounts of sensation take that view to be one that 
must be refuted before moving on to expound a true theory of sensation. The 
other three views, then, reject the need for an agent sense to render the species 
sensible. Nonetheless, despite that basic point of agreement, the remaining di­
vergences are quite significant. The first account holds that the sensible form, 
transmitted to the sense power through the medium of a sensible species is 
the total efficient cause of the act of sensing. The second view holds that the 
sensible species is a partial efficient cause of the operation of the sense power, 
but not a complete one. On this view, the sense power contributes its own
3 V. Casten, «Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality», Philosophy and Phenomenolog­
ical Research 58 (1998) 249-298.
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proper causality to the complete sensory act. Finally, the third view holds that 
the sensible species plays no efficient causal role in the sensory act.
Both Suárez and Zabaraella took Thomas Aquinas to be the primary ex­
ponent of the first view, and so his position is at the center of their accounts, 
rejecting Thomas’s view, the view that denies that there is any contributing 
efficient causality on the part of the sense power, and proposing alternatives 
that address issues not found in Aquinas. I will treat Suárez as a representative 
of the second position, while my example of the third position will be Zab- 
arella. Other representatives could be possible, but Suárez’s Commentary on 
the De anima (c. 1573) and Zabarella’s De sensu agente (published in 1590, 
posthumously, but representing work from his years as an ordinary professor 
at Padua) were written within 20 years of each other. Not only are these two 
thinkers roughly contemporary, however, they also represent two very differ­
ent strands of sixteenth century thought, one a Jesuit scholastic approach and 
the other a radically secular approach. Indeed, Zabarella published little even 
on metaphysics and said nothing about theological topics. Nonetheless, inter­
estingly, they both diagnose the same problem in the Thomistic approach and 
come up with rather different solutions to that problem.
Both thinkers identify Thomas as committed to the view that the sensible 
species is the sole provider of intentional content. Of course, that is not the 
way they state the problem, but that in essence is the view they attribute to 
him. In short, both hold that Thomas claims that the sensible species received, 
for example, in the visual power, causes the intentional content of the act of 
seeing. Thus, what makes a sensory act a sensory act is the reception of some 
representational image or likeness in the relevant sense power. And that is all 
there is to the story. A couple of representative texts from Thomas are used in 
support of their interpretation:
a) It must be said that the sense being affected is its sensation itself4.
b) The cognition of the external sense is perfected through the alteration alone of 
the sense from a sensible. Hence, through a form that is impressed on it by a sen­
sible, it senses5.
Indeed, Thomas goes so far as to say that the reception of the species is 
sufficient for sensory cognition:
For there is one sort of agent that is sufficient of itself for bringing about its form 
in the recipient, as fire is sufficient of itself for warming. There is another sort of
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 17, 2 ad 1 : «Dicendum quod sensum affici, est 
ipsum eius sentire».
5 Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet V, Q. 2 ad 2: «Cognitio sensus exterioris perficitur per solam 
immutationem sensus a sensibili: unde per formam quae sibi a sensibile imprimitur, sentit».
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agent that is not sufficient of itself for bringing about its form in the recipient unless 
another agent comes to assist it [superveniat], as the heat of fire is not sufficient 
for bringing to completion the action of nutrition except through the power of the 
nutritive soul. From this consideration the power of the nutritive soul is what chief­
ly acts {principaliter agens), while fiery heat [acts only] instrumentally. There is 
similarly also diversity on the part of the recipient. For there is one kind of recipi­
ent that does not work together with an agent at all, as the stone when it is thrown 
upward or the wood when a bench is made from it. And there is another kind of 
recipient that does work together with the agent, as the stone when thrown down 
and the body of a human being when it is made healthy by the art [of medicine]. 
According to this, things that are outside the human soul are related in a threefold 
way to the diverse powers of the soul. For things are related to the exterior senses 
as sufficient agents with which the recipients do not work together, but only receive 
[their action]. The fact that color through itself cannot move what is seen unless 
light comes to assist it is not in conflict with what was said, because both color and 
light are counted as among those things that are outside the soul. The exterior sens­
es receive only from the things by way of being affected without it being the case 
that they work together in its formation, although already the things formed have a 
proper operation, which is the judgment of proper objects. But for the imagination 
the things that are outside the soul are considered as sufficient agents. For the ac­
tion of the sensible thing does not remain in the sense but penetrates further to the 
phantasia or imagination. Nevertheless, the imagination is a recipient that works 
together with an agent, for imagination itself forms for itself likenesses of certain 
things that it has never perceived through sense from those that it received through 
sense, by composing and dividing them. For example, we imagine gold mountains 
that we have never seen from our having seen gold and mountains. But the things 
are related to the possible intellect as insufficient agent6.
6 Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet Vili, a. 2, q. 1 : «Dicendum quod anima humana similitudines 
rerum quibus cognoscit, accipit a rebus illo modo accipiendi quo patiens accipit ab agente: 
quod non est intelligendum quasi agens influat in patiens eamdem numero speciem quam habet 
in seipso, sed generat sui similem educendo de potentia in actum. Et per hunc modum dicitur 
species coloris deferri a corpore colorato ad visum. Sed in agentibus et patientibus distinguen­
dum est. Est enim quoddam agens quod de se sufficiens est ad inducendum formam suam in 
patiens, sicut ignis de se sufficit ad calefaciendum. Quoddam vero agens est quod non sufficit 
de se ad inducendum formam suam in patiens, nisi superveniat aliud agens; sicut calor ignis non 
sufficit ad complendum actionem nutritionis nisi per virtutem animae nutriti vae: unde virtus 
animae nutritivae est principaliter agens, calor vero igneus instrumentaliter. Similiter etiam est 
diversitas ex parte patientium. Quoddam enim est patiens quod in nullo cooperatur agenti; sicut 
lapis cum sursum proiicitur, vel lignum cum ex eo fit scamnum. Quoddam vero patiens est quod 
cooperatur agenti; sicut lapis cum deorsum proiicitur, et corpus hominis cum sanatur per artem. 
Et secundum hoc, res quae sunt extra animam tripliciter se habent ad diversas animae potentias. 
Ad sensus enim exteriores se habent sicut agentia sufficientia, quibus patientia non cooperantur, 
sed recipiunt tantum. Quod autem color per se non possit movere visum nisi lux superveniat, 
non est contra hoc quod dictum est; quia tam color quam lux, inter ea quae sunt extra ani­
mam, computantur. Sensus autem exteriores suscipiunt tantum a rebus per modum patiendi,
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Here, then, is the big point of controversy: for Thomas Aquinas, there is 
little for the external sense power to do in the act of sensing other than receive 
the species.
Such a picture of the act of sensing threatens, however, to contradict a char­
acteristic of cognitive acts that distinguishes them from non-cognitive acts: 
their immanence. Recall that for Aristotelians activities come in two broad 
types: transitive and immanent. In transitive activity, the agent causes a change 
in another reality while immanent actions remain within the agent. All of our 
thinkers agree that cognitive actions are paradigmatically immanent activi­
ties7. Indeed, Thomas argues that since the end of every transitive activity is 
outside the agent, and the end of every immanent activity is within its agent, 
the sensible species, an image and likeness of a sensible object, is required 
for playing the role of an end in the sensory act8. Both Suárez and Zabarella, 
though, read Thomas as actually undermining the immanence of the sensory 
act. The problem is clearest when we consider the long passage above. It in-
sine hoc quod aliquid cooperentur ad sui formationem; quamvis iam formati habeant propriam 
operationem, quae est iudicium de propriis obiectis. Sed ad imaginationem res quae sunt extra 
animam, comparantur ut agentia sufficientia. Actio enim rei sensibilis non sistit in sensu, sed 
ulterius pertingit usque ad phantasiam, sive imaginationem. Tamen imaginatio est patiens quod 
cooperatur agenti: ipsa enim imaginatio format sibi aliquarum rerum similitudines, quas nun­
quam sensu percepit, ex his tamen quae sensu recipiuntur, componendo ea et dividendo; sicut 
imaginamur montes aureos, quos nunquam vidimus, ex hoc quod vidimus aurum et montes. 
Sed ad intellectum possibilem comparantur res sicut agentia insufficientia. Actio enim ipsarum 
rerum sensibilium nec etiam in imaginatione sistit; sed phantasmata ulterius movent intellec­
tum possibilem. Non autem ad hoc quod ex seipsis sufficiant, cum sint in potentia intelligibilia; 
intellectus autem non movetur nisi ab intelligibili in actu. Unde oportet quod superveniat actio 
intellectus agentis, cuius illustratione phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia in actu, sicut illustratione 
lucis corporalis fiunt colores visibiles actu. Et sic patet quod intellectus agens est principale 
agens, quod agit rerum similitudines in intellectu possibili. Phantasmata autem quae a rebus ex­
terioribus accipiuntur, sunt quasi agentia instrumentaba: intellectus enim possibilis comparatur 
ad res quarum notitiam recipit, sicut patiens quod cooperatur agenti: multo enim magis potest 
intellectus formare quidditatem rei quae non cecidit sub sensu, quam imaginatio».
7 Summa theologiae I, Q. 54, a. 2. For a discussion of the two types of activity in Thomas and 
other references to the distinction in Thomas and Aristotle, see the helpful account in J. Owens, 
An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, Milwaukee 1963, 192-204.
8 Summa theologiae I, Q. 14, a. 2. The literature on the notion of cognitive species in Thomas 
is extensive. Helpful orientation can be found in G. Picard, «Essai sur la connaissance sensi­
ble d’après les scolastiques», Archives de philosophie 4 (1926) 1-93; G. van Riet, «La théorie 
thomiste de la sensation externe», Revue philosophique de Louvain 51 (1953) 374-408; B.J. 
Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Notre Dame 1967, 128-33, 158-181; A. Wild­
er, «On the Knowing Species in St. Thomas: their Necessity and Epistemological Innocence», 
Angelicum 68 (1991) 3-32; L. Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge 
Voi. 1: Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions, Leiden 1994, 156-74. Spruit, in chapters 1 
and 2, also provides a helpful overview of the development of the notion of a cognitive species.
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troduces an important dis-analogy between sense cognition and intellectual 
cognition. If the sensible species is sufficient for sensory cognition, there is no 
need for any activity in the sense power to effect such cognition. The lesson is 
straightforward: the sensible qualities existing in objects are actually sensible 
in a way that the phantasm in the imagination is not actually intelligible. I 
shall return to this di-analogy at the end of the paper.
For now, though, I want to turn to a second important dis-analogy Thomas 
introduces between acts of sensory cognition and acts of intellectual cogni­
tion, one that we can call an operational dis-analogy9. The second dis-analogy 
consists in the fact that the intellect produces an «expressed species», that 
is, a concept or a verbum mentis, as the result of the act of intellection while 
sensation produces no such result in the act of sensing10. It follows, then, that 
there is no problem in viewing intellection as an immanent act: once the po­
tential intellect is informed by the intelligible species, it begins its immanent 
act that has as an end the concept it expresses. The picture is not nearly as 
clear, however, in the case of sensation. The only ends of sensory activity 
are the sensible species and the sensory act. But, the sensory act is precise­
ly what requires an immanent end, so it cannot play that role by itself, and 
the only other candidate in sight for an end is the sensible species. Now, the 
sensible species cannot be the end of an immanent act since its production is 
outside the sense power. Suárez and Zabarella both think this issue is fatal to 
Thomas’s account of sensory cognition as an immanent act. While it is easy 
to imagine why Thomas wants to hold that the reception of the species alone 
is adequate to explain sensation, namely, since it preserves the directness of 
sensation, nonetheless, Thomas thereby appears to jeopardize the immanence 
of the act of sensing. Here is how Suárez frames his objection:
For if it [a cognitive power] operated through a species as through an accident 
inhering in it (as water heats through heat), it would follow that the power is not 
cognitive from itself (de se) but because it would have it from something extrinsic 
through the species. Therefore, this proposition, «the intellect understands», would 
not be per se, but per accidens, just as «this water heats»11.
Zabarella, too, agrees that Thomas is committed to the view that the sen­
sible species is the sole efficient cause of sensation. His argument against
9 There is a third dis-analogy between the two that I will not be discussing here because all 
the thinkers I am considering in this paper agree on it, namely, sense’s organic status and the 
intellect’s non-organic status.
10 For the rejection of an expressed species in sensory cognition, see Summa theologiae I, Q. 
85, a. 2 ad 3; Quodlibet V, a. 9, ad 2.
11 F. Suárez, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotolis De anima, disp. V, 
q. 4, no. 5 [Vol. 2, 356], S. Castellote ed. 3 vols. Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicationes 
[vols.l and 2] and Fundación Xavier Zubiri [vol.3], 1978-1991.
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Thomas, though, takes a rather different tack. Zabarella believes that such a 
view reverses the relative «nobility» of sensible object and power. Now ev­
eryone agrees that the sensible object is an «ignoble» accident and the sense 
power is exceedingly noble. After all, the latter is a power of the soul while 
the former is an accident of a material form. If one thinks that it is possible to 
rank reality by degrees of nobility, it certainly is plausible that a power of the 
soul is nobler than the color in a leaf floating on the wind. Given this rather 
obvious point, Zabarella goes on to show how a view like Thomas’s would 
imply, counter-intuitively, that the sensible object is nobler than the power:
That thing is more perfect than another whose most perfect operation is nobler than 
the most perfect operation of the other, for the operation indicates the essence. The 
most perfect operation of sense, according to Thomas, is to be passive (pati) and to 
receive sensation, for he concedes no active power in it. However, the most perfect 
operation of the object or species is to act and produce sensation. Now it is nobler to 
act than to be passive (pati) and, therefore, the object will be nobler than the sense12.
Moreover, Zabarella points out that the operations at issue here are the ones 
that are most perfect and proper to the two entities under consideration on 
Thomas’s account. Thus, he blocks the potential response from Thomas and 
his followers that we are talking only about relative nobility and inferiority to 
the extent that the object is in act and the power is only in potency. For this 
reason, Zabarella concludes, the sensory power must be the primary agent, 
indeed the sole agent, responsible for sensation. This is, admittedly, a very dif­
ficult argument. Fortunately, it is not his only argument against Thomas’s view 
since he, too, will argue that Thomas puts into jeopardy the immanence of the 
act of sensing. I think this argument is worth stressing, however, because of 
its oddness. I think it shows emphatically just how puzzling the experience of 
sensation had become to philosophers in the sixteenth century. For his part, 
Thomas takes sensory experience to be rather unproblematic. Thanks to a spe­
cial kind of alteration {immutatio) effected by the impressed sensible species, 
the sensory power senses13. Of course, Thomas has recourse to a technical
12 J. Zabarella, Liber De sensu agente in his De rebus naturalibus libri XXX, quibus quaes­
tiones quae ab Aristotelis interpretibus hodie tractari solent, accurate discutiuntur (Frankfurt, 
1606/07), cols. 831-856, Vili, 849. In what follows, I refer to this work as De sensu agente and 
cite it by chapter and column number. I use the reprint edition published by Minerva G.M.B.H. 
in 1966. The work was first published in 1590. For further information concerning the notion of 
an agent sense, see E.R Mahoney, «Agostino Nifo's De sensu agente», Archiv für Geschichte 
der Philosophie 53 (1971) 119-42; A. Pattin, «Pour l'histoire du sens agent au moyen âge», 
Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 16-17 (1975-75) 100-113; idem., Pour l'histoire du sens 
agent : la controverse entre Barthélémy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun, ses antecedents et son 
evolution: etude et textes inédits, Leuven 1988.
13 Quodlibet, V, q. 2 ad 2: «Cognitio sensus exterioris perficitur per solam immutationem 
sensus a sensibili: unde per formam quae sibi a sensibile imprimitur, sentit».
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vocabulary here: the alteration is an «intentional» or «spiritual» alteration. 
Zabarella’s argument, though, seems designed to call into question this spe­
cial kind of alteration—a kind of alteration that just might make the sensible 
object more noble than the sense power if we take «spiritual» in this context 
to mean immaterial. Whatever Thomas means by «spiritual» or «intentional» 
alteration, he does not mean immaterial alteration—although that misunder­
standing seems to be fairly persistent in the literature14. Even if intentional 
and spiritual in this context, however, do not mean immaterial, they do point 
to something very mysterious about sensible objects, namely, that they can 
affect us in two ways. It did not take long for subsequent thinkers to worry 
about this. Indeed, there’s a rather famous anomalous passage in Thomas’s 
De potentia in which he seems to suggest that what makes sensible objects 
peculiarly able to effect us in two ways is their participation in the causality 
of separate substances. I have no good story to tell about how that passage is 
to be read within the context of Thomas’s account of sensation, but Cardinal 
Cajetan in the 16th century placed great stress on that very passage to explain 
how sensible objects can effect us in two ways15. Also, many thinkers opted 
for an agent sense theory for precisely the same sort of reasons. The sensible 
object cannot be nobler than the soul, yet it must be the case that the senses 
are passive. Thus, the sensible species needs to be made ontologically on a 
par with the sense power and only a sense power can do that. It is striking 
that both Suárez and Zabarella reject the accounts of Cajetan and agent sense 
theorists. That is, both want to deny that there’s some special agent that pro­
vides the sensible species with some unusual power to produce two sorts of 
alteration. I will return to this point in my concluding remarks.
In summary, then, both Suárez and Zabarella reject Thomas’s apparent 
view that the reception of the species is a sufficient condition for sensation to 
occur. For both, the alternative each chooses consists in expanding the range 
of activity of the sense power, although each differs on the extent of that ex­
pansion. I will examine Suárez’s account first.
Suárez holds that the sensible species can only be a «partially completing 
immediate instrument» {partialiter complens immediatum instrumentum)16.
14 M. Burnyeat, «Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception», in D. Perler, ed., Ancient 
and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, Leiden 2001, 129-53. For additional discussion of 
Thomas’s account of «intentional» and «Spiritual» alteration, see J. South, «Suárez and the 
Problem of External Sensation», Medieval Philosophy amd Theology 10 (2001) 218-224.
15 De potentia, V. 8. For Cajetan, see II. 11 of his Commentaria in De anima, P.I. Coquelle, 
O.P., ed., 2 vols. Rome 1939,252-254.
16 DA V.4.16 (2: 366). Picard, «Essai sur la connaissance sensible», 38-41, J.M. Alejandro, 
La gnoseologia del Doctor Eximio y la acusación nominalista, Comillas 1948, 196-199, S.C. 
Cubells, Die Anthropologie des Suárez, Munich 1962, 112-117, and T. Rinaldi, «Il problema 
delle “species” conoscitive nel De anima di Suárez» in A. Lamacchia, ed., La filosofia nel Siglo
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Its role is to bring the passive sense power to a higher level of actuality, while 
reserving for the sense power the actual operation made possible by the newly 
attained level of actuality17. The impressed species has a determinative role 
to play in the process, but the power itself plays the crucial role. Suárez goes 
on to distinguish three components of the activity of the sense power. There 
is the production of the act {productio), the reception of the act {receptio) 
and the act itself {actio). This last is the intrinsic end or terminus of the sense 
experience, thereby ensuring the immanence of the sensory act18. Note that 
the reception mentioned here should not be confused with the reception of 
the impressed sensible species, but rather refers to the fact that the cognitive 
power is brought to a higher level of actuality. In other words, the act is «re­
ceived» in the power as a qualitative change in that power and the produced 
act of cognition is itself a quality {qualitas)19. It is the sense power informed 
by the impressed species, not the impressed species itself, that is, the intrinsic 
necessary condition of the act of sensing, while the completed act is the ter­
minus. Thus, the power begins its activity once it is informed by an impressed 
sensible species and once the activity is finished, sensation has taken place. 
The two terms, the production of the act and the act itself, Suárez clarifies, 
are not to be understood as two really distinct moments, but are instead only 
formally distinct. This clarification may or may not be helpful depending on 
how clear one finds the notion of formal distinction. Nonetheless, the point 
of Suárez’s account is clear enough: like intellection, sensation is productive 
of an expressed species that is an immanent terminus of a wholly immanent 
act. In this way, Suárez preserves the analogy between sense and intellect in 
a way that Thomas cannot, but does so by expanding the causal role of the 
sense power. Having said all of this, it is necessary to note that Suárez iden­
tifies the expressed species with the completed act of sensing itself. Thus, the 
entire process that he delineates might seem to be merely a more complicated 
description of Thomas’s account—after all, for Thomas the act of sensing did 
not result in an expressed species. But this view breaks down when one recog­
nizes that Thomas takes the expressed species to be something distinct from 
the act itself. If there is no distinction between the completed sensory act and
de Oro: Studi sul tardo Rinascimento Espagnola, Bari 1995, 429-64 all correctly stress the 
instrumentality of the species in the context of the immanent process of sensation.
17 DA V.4.8 (2: 258). W. Neidl, Der Realitäts Begriff des Franz Suarez nach den «Disputa­
tiones Metaphysicae», Munich 1966, 12-17 provides a succinct account of the background for 
Suárez's understanding of the various levels of actuality in the process of cognition.
,SDA III.2.16 (2: 100).
19 DA V.5.6 (2: 376). Cf. DA III.2.16 (2:100) where Suárez states that vision itself is a quali­
ty. See T. Rinaldi, «II problema» (cf. nt. 16), 459-62 for further discussion of the notion of «ac­
tio» in Suárez. It is unclear whether Thomas agrees that cognition is a quality. For discussion, 
see J. Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (cf. nt. 7), 192-203, esp. at note 5 on 194.
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the expressed species, what kind of explanatory force does Suárez’s account 
provide? Are we only talking a terminological difference with Thomas? No, 
we are not and the reason is clear: the causality exercised by the impressed 
species is not sufficient to produce an act of sensing. Suárez’s rather baroque 
description is designed to show that the sensory power plays the primary role 
in producing the sensory act.
While in Suárez we see the downplaying of the causal efficacy of the im­
pressed species, he still admits that it plays an instrumentally efficient causal 
role. Turning to Zabarella, though, we find a denial that the impressed species 
plays any efficient causal role at all: the sense power alone is the efficient 
cause of the sensory act:
Thus, the object can have no power (vis) in the production of cognition, although 
it can furnish something to sense that is necessary for sensation. For it produces 
{efficit) the species without which sensation could not arise, but it in no way is the 
efficient cause. Therefore, the species itself does not have the role of the agent in 
sensation, but only the role of generated form and produced effect20.
So, while the reception of the species is necessary for sensation to occur, 
it plays no efficient causal role in the act of sensation. Here Zabarella makes 
an interesting move in claiming that an account like Suárez’s does not prop­
erly save the immanence of the sensory act. His objection is that a view like 
Suárez’s does not really save the immanence of the sensory act because it 
makes the sensible species what he calls a «true agent»21. For Zabarella, «ev­
ery true agent needs a patient in which it might act and the same thing cannot 
undergo and receive something from itself»22. In short, he turns Suárez’s ar­
gument against Thomas against the very view that Suárez defends. In other 
words, if, for Suárez, the sensible species cannot be the principle efficient 
cause because that jeopardizes immanence, we can ask why we should think 
that instrumental causality is any less problematic. Consider a paradigm case 
of instrumental causality: the role of the pen in writing. The primary efficient 
cause of writing is the hand that holds the pen, while the pen is an instrumental 
cause. Nonetheless, the action of the pen is a real action and thus it is, in Zab­
arella’s terminology a «true agent». And indeed, the action of the pen is not 
received within the pen, but is transitive, that is, it makes marks on paper. For
20 De sensu agente, Vili, 850-51 : «Obiectum vero nullam potest vim habere efficiendi cog­
nitionem, licet possit aliquid sensui subministrare necessarium ad sensionem, efficit enim spe­
ciem, sine qua sensio non fieret, sed ipsius sensionis nullo modo est causa effectrix: ipsa vero 
species in sensione non habet locum agentis, sed solum formae genitae, et effectus producti». 
For additional discussion of Zabarella’s account of sensation, see J. South, «Zabarella and the 
Intentionality of Sensation», Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 57 (2002) 5-25.
21 Zabarella does not refer to Suárez in this context, but attributes the view to Scotus.
22 De sensu agente, X, 853-4.
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Zabarella, reserving any efficient causality for the species, however instru­
mental, destroys the immanence of the sensory act. What needs explaining is 
how the same power can be both passive and active, how it can both undergo 
and act without jeopardizing immanence. The key to solving that problem for 
Zabarella, is found in the role that the soul plays in the process of sensation.
The soul goes to work in the second stage of the sensory process, conse­
quent on the reception of the species, and its role is to make a «judgment». It 
is important to be very clear about this point. Zabarella is not saying that the 
sense power judges, he is saying that the soul judges. There are two questions 
that must be asked here: a) what is the soul doing in the story (as opposed to 
the ensouled organ or sense power)? and b) what does «judgment» mean in 
this context? The second issue is easily explicated. Judgment in this context 
means only a kind of awareness:
For it often happens that we do not see a colored reality (res) placed before the eyes 
because although an impression of the species arises in the eye (for if no impedi­
ment exists, this cannot be denied), nevertheless the soul, intent on other realities, 
judges nothing about the species23.
The second problematic issue is rather more difficult and before we can deal 
with it, two potential misunderstandings require addressing. First, it might 
seem that Zabarella is proposing an account in which the species received in 
the sense organ is subsequently sensed by the soul itself. That cannot be cor­
rect, though, because that would mean that the object of sense would be the 
species. However, for Zabarella the nature of the species is intrinsically rep­
resentational and to be representational is to refer to something other. We see 
the red of the rose, not its sensible species. In short, then, Zabarella is not sug­
gesting that the soul is somehow only able to be aware of the species. Second, 
it would be tempting to read Zabarella as arguing that the soul is somehow 
moved, perhaps even «excited», by the sensible species and that the reception 
of the species explains why Aristotle says that «to sense is to undergo». Again, 
this cannot be correct and the reason is that sensation is an immanent, not a 
transitive activity. Accordingly, the reception of a species cannot constitute
23 De sensu agente, IX, 852: «Nam saepe contingit ut rem coloratum ob oculos positam non 
videamus, quia licet fiat impressio speciei in oculo (nullo enim existente impedimento id negari 
non potest) attamen anima aliis rebus intenta, speciem illam non iudicat». There are real echoes 
of the thought of Albert the Great in Zabarella’s discussion about the act of sensation, just as 
there was for his account of the sensible species. Albert, too, placed «judgment» (iudicium) 
at the center of his account of sensation. However, he located the faculty of judgment in the 
common sense, not the soul itself. For Albert, see De anima, II, 4, 8, C. Stroick, ed., voi. 7.1 
of Opera omnia, B. Geyer, ed., Münster i. Westfalen 1968, 159, 71-80. For discussion, see M. 
Tweedale, «Origins of the Medieval Theory that Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a 
Form», Philosophical Topics 20 (1992) 219-20.
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the manner in which sense is passive since that passivity is not part of the act 
of sensing. Zabarella concludes that the very same sense power must be both 
active and passive within itself, otherwise sensation would not be in the per­
son sensing. Thus, that which is received in the sense power is not the species, 
but the very act of sensing:
Therefore, in this way vision is an immanent action because it is received in the 
agent itself, namely, in the soul or in the animate body insofar as it is animate. 
Thus, if vision had no other agent than material color, it would be without doubt a 
transitive action.24
Accordingly, Zabarella is committed to the claim that consequent to the 
reception of the species in a sensory organ, the soul itself turns its attention to 
the species and through the species is aware of the sensible quality existing in 
the external object. I will return to a consideration of Zabarella’s motivation in 
bringing in the soul here shortly. First, though, I proceed to the third moment 
of the sensory process.
This third moment occurs when the soul’s awareness of the action of the 
sensible species on the organ is received in the animated organ, that is, the 
sense power. The activity of the sensory act, then, is the «judgment» or aware­
ness of the soul consequent on the reception of the species while the passivity 
is the reception of that very awareness in the sense power, a composite of soul 
and organ. Zabarella summarizes:
First, from the action of a material object there is a reception of the species in the 
organ, for example, of color in the eye. Second, the soul brings forth a judgment 
and in this way is said to act. Third, the judgment is received in the whole com­
posite, namely, the animate organ and thus the soul, as its part, is said to undergo25.
In short, if the species has no efficient causality in the sensory process and 
if the sense power itself must be the agent in sensing, then there must be some 
passivity in the sense power to save the notion that sensing is a kind of change. 
Since the species and the agency of sense cannot provide the necessary ele­
ment of passivity, some other feature must. Of course, there is one very ob­
vious objection to Zabarella’s position: is not the sense power’s reception of 
the soul’s awareness the result of some activity of the soul? If so, doesn’t that 
jeopardize the immanence of the sensory act? In other words, why should we 
think that the soul’s awareness is not some kind of «true action»? Zabarella is
24 De sensu agente, IX, 852: «Sic igitur visio est actio immanens, quia recipitur in ipsomet 
agente, nempe in anima, seu in corpore animato quatenus est animatum: quod si nullum aliud 
agens haberet visio, nisi materialem colorem, esset absque dubio actio transiens».
25 De sensu agente, X, 854: «Primum enim ab actione obiecti materialis sit in organo recpetio 
speciei, ut coloris in oculo; secundo anima iudicium profert, et ita agere dicitur; tertio recipitur 
iudicium in toto composito, nempe organo animato, et ita anima tanquam eius pars dicitur pati».
ASPECTS OF INTENTIONALITY IN TWO 16TH CENTURY ARISTOTELIANS 737
prepared for this objection. Instead, of its being a true action, Zabarella con­
siders the action of the soul an «emanation», where by emanation he means an 
action that can be performed within a process of immanent change and such 
that this emanation of the soul’s awareness of the species results in a change 
within the sense power itself—the third and receptive moment of the sensory 
process—but not in some real change. Zabarella is quick to add that this dis­
tinction between the soul’s awareness of the species and its reception in the 
sense organ is a difference in nature. Temporally, they are simultaneous26.
At this point, I want to discuss a central feature of this account of sensa­
tion in a bit more detail. Since Zabarella places a stress on the activity of the 
sense power itself, its intention and judgment, at the expense of the reception 
of the species, it is necessary to think more about the nature of this judgment 
or awareness. A metaphor that Zabarella uses in this context is important. He 
suggests that the soul «drinks up» or «absorbs» (imbibere) the species received 
in the organ27. This metaphor suggests strongly that the species is causally 
ineffective and the soul is effective: the soul is «attentive», is «reaching out 
to» the species. The point he is making seems clear enough, but the process 
by which the soul is aware of the reception of a species is less than clear. If it 
were the ensouled organ, the power, that was aware, the thesis would sound 
less strange. In making it the soul, directly, that is aware of the species and 
senses through it, however, he accomplishes two things. First, he emphasizes 
the activity of sense, the attentive awareness that we bring to sensory percep­
tion. At the same time, though, the metaphor points to a kind of explanatory 
«black box». He has relocated, as it were, the place of mystery in sensation. 
Unlike those thinkers who have to hold a view that builds awareness into the 
natural processes of sensible objects in such a way that the species is sufficient 
for cognition, Zabarella opts rather for keeping the naturalness of the creation 
of the species. Its residual materiality is continuous with the material sensible 
forms from which it arises. This allows him to attribute the true spiritualizing 
process to an agent - the human soul operating without an organ - that is both 
internal to the person sensing, as opposed to God or separate substances, and 
capable of creating something truly spiritual.
26 De sensu agente, X, 854-55.
27 De sensu agente, X, 854. This metaphor has deep medieval roots, and also is used by 
Zabarella in his discussion of intellectual cognition. For discussion of the history of «imbibere» 
in the context of medieval discussions of cognition, see L. Spruit, Species Intelligibilis (cf. nt. 
8), II, 228-230 where he traces the notion of «imbibere» back to Olivi. Of particular interest 
is the fact that Zabarella rejects this metaphor when discussing the relation between phantasm 
and agent intellect, since the phantasm is not directly accessible to the intellect prior to the 
production of an intelligible species. See his De speciebus intelligibilibus, chapter VI, columns 
992-95.
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Return now to the original question of this essay, Casten’s question: What 
provides the content of a mental state? On the 16th century reading of Thomas, 
he would answer that the sensible species provides the content. By contrast, 
both Suárez and Zabarella reject that view opting instead for views that make 
the species causally problematic for content. Instead, both stress the activity of 
the power as contributing to intentional content. Recall earlier that I deferred 
discussion of a dis-analogy between sense and intellect introduced by Thomas 
namely, the dis-analogy between sensibles as actually sensible and phantasms 
as merely potentially intelligible. It seems clear that both Suárez and Zaba­
rella, surprisingly enough, have tried to overcome that dis-analogy. Sensibles 
as they exist in the world are not actually sensible apart from some efficient 
causality on the part of the sense power. What we have here in Zabarella, and 
in a less radicalized form in Suárez, is a rather startling departure from a view 
that we take to be paradigmatic to Aristotle, namely the two-fold alteration of 
the sensible object on the sense power; one material and one «intentional». Of 
course, this use of «intentional» to describe this peculiar type of alteration is 
not Aristotle’s, though it is Thomas’s, and I think here Thomas gets Aristotle 
right. But both Suárez and Zabarella now seem committed to the view that the 
content of our sensory acts is not exhaustively provided by the sensible spe­
cies. In other words, there is some content in our acts of sensing that cannot be 
reduced to the activity of the sensible species.
I do not think that there is any way to say more about this claim that is con­
jecture, but permit me to try nonetheless. Although I do not have the space in 
this paper to show it, both Suárez and Zabarella match their reconfigurations 
of the activity of the sense power with reconfigurations of the nature of the 
sensible species. For both thinkers, the sensible species is not immaterial (in 
our modem sense of immaterial), but physical—and physical in a way that 
comes close to meaning what we take material to mean today. Sensible species 
are admittedly not material in that they are constituted by matter, but they are 
material in the sense that they are material forms—that is, they are extend­
ed in space. They are imperfect participations of the sensible forms present 
in things. They have a kind of defective existence being radically dependent 
on the activity of the originating sensible form. Consequently, by stressing 
the «materiality» of the species and concomitantly arguing that the species is 
not causally responsible for content, both Suárez and Zabarella seem to have 
separated the realms of the mental and the physical to an extent that would 
shock Aristotle. Zabarella at least is clear, however, that what he is doing is 
a reconceptualization of the notion of intentionality within the tradition. He 
points out that the Latin thinkers (Latini) understood the term to refer to «that 
through which the soul, as through a formal reason, tended (tendit) to the 
object to be known. Consequently, they call all species, sensible and intelli­
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gible, «intentions»28. Zabarella, by contrast, argues that an intention is only 
an «attention» {attentio) and «attentiveness» {diligentia) in the soul to the 
consideration of some reality29. Now that seems strikingly Augustinian, and 
Casten, when talking about Augustine on intentionality, points to the notion of 
selective attention as a central, if not unique feature of Augustine’s account of 
intentionality. Moreover, both Suárez and Zabarella adduce selective attention 
as evidence for the activity of the sense power. Again, as Casten points out, 
commentators have «endlessly (and unconvincingly)» looked for an account 
of this phenomenon in philosophers earlier than Augustine. So, there seems to 
be something about selective attention that strikes Augustine, Suárez and Zab­
arella as essential to any account of intentional content. Does this mean that 
Suárez and Zabarella have gone back to Augustine as a philosophical source?
I don’t think so. First, I know of no place in Zabarella’s writings where 
he even mentions Augustine. Suárez, obviously, has a much more extensive 
acquaintance with Augustine, but does not refer to him in the context of his 
discussion of sensory experience. But if not Augustine, what is the source of 
their critique of the Aristotelian position? What follows is partly speculative 
on my part, but I do have some evidence. There is a mysterious passage in 
Averroes that is central to accounts of sensation in the later middle ages and 
Renaissance. Both Suárez and Zabarella are certainly familiar with it, since 
proponents of an agent sense theory appeal to it repeatedly and they both go 
to great lengths to reject an agent sense view30. The passage I have in mind is 
from the Long Commentary on the De Anima:
One can say that sensibles do not move the senses in accord with the way that 
they exist outside the soul, for they move the senses insofar as they are inten­
tions, since in matter they are not intentions in act, but in potency. And one can­
not say that this difference occurs by virtue of the difference of subject such that 
the intentions come to be on account of a spiritual matter which is the sense, not 
on account of an external mover. For it is better to think that the reason for the 
difference of matter is the difference of forms, rather than that the difference of 
matter is the reason for the difference of forms. Since it is so, we must assert that 
the external mover in the case of the senses is different from the sensibles, as was 
necessary in the case of the intellect. It was seen, therefore, that if we concede 
that the difference of forms is the reason for the difference of matter, it will be 
necessary that the mover be external. But Aristotle was silent about this because
28 De visu, 1,6,870: «Latini quidem huius vocis etymologiam considerantes, dicunt intentionem 
vocari id, per quod tanquam per rationem formalem anima tendit in obiectum cognoscendum».
29 De visu, I, 6,871.
30 In passing, too, it is worth remarking that it is rather difficult to imagine a thinker with less 
affinity to Augustine than Averroes.
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it is hidden in the case of sensation and is apparent in the case of intellect. You 
ought to give this consideration, since it requires investigation31.
This notoriously opaque passage was the source of late medieval discus­
sions of the agent sense. I do not claim to understand the passage fully, but its 
central point is that sensibles are not actually sensible without some external 
agency. While both Suárez and Zabarella reject the need to posit an agent 
sense, a really distinct sense power in which sensibles in act are produced in 
order to be received in the potential sense power, they nonetheless do accept 
agency on the part of sense. If there is a common source for their thought, I 
think it is more likely to be in the ramifications of this passage than in some 
common return to Augustine.
Let me close by pointing to two interesting consequences of Suárez’s and 
Zabarella’s accounts. First, it turns out that in the case of sensation, at least, 
both have abandoned Aristotle and Aristotelian methodology. Myles Bumyeat 
has recently made this point clearly:
A true Aristotelian is one who is content with [an] appeal to a power or potency, 
who resists the demand for underlying material processes to activate the power or 
a categorical (non-dispositional) base to explain it32.
On this criterion, both Suárez and Zabarella clearly are not Aristotelian in 
their accounts of intentionality. If Bumyeat is right about Aristotle and Thom­
as, as I think he is, then both are committed to an out of date physics anyway, 
one in which sensible objects can perform mysterious alterations upon sense 
powers that are different from ordinary kinds of material alterations. Second, 
there is a connected issue, if I am right in my account above, a study of these 
two authors points the way towards rethinking the relation between Augustine 
and Descartes. It is sometimes assumed that Suárez is deeply imbued with an 
Augustinian heritage33. However, while he is clearly adopting a variant of an 
«active theory of sensation», he is doing so only because of what he sees as 
problematic within the Aristotelian theory of sensation. The comparison with 
Zabarella makes that point even clearer. If any thinker shows less concern for 
Augustine, it is hard to imagine who it might be. Nonetheless, his position is 
even more «Augustinian» than Suárez’s. Perhaps it’s time we learned to take
31 Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis de anima libros, F. Stuart Crawford, 
ed., {Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem, V. 1; Cambridge (Mass.) 1953), II, comm. 
60, p. 221, lines 40-57. The translation is that of R. Taylor’s in Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordo­
ba, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, New Haven 2009, 172.
32 M. Burnyeat, «Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception» (cf. nt. 14), 150.
33 See the discussion in N. Abercrombie, Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought, 
New York 1972 [reprint of the 1938 edition].
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the late 16th century on its own terms and recognize it as the real source of the 
philosophical atmosphere Descartes breathed.
Department of Philosophy James South
Marquette University
P.O. Box 1881, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881 
Office: (414) 288-6729 
j ame s. south@marquette. edu
SUMMARY
The two 16th century philosophers, Francisco Suárez and Jacopo Zabarella are 
rarely considered together, since they represent two strands of Aristotelian thought: 
the Scholastic and the «Paduan». In this paper, I consider their accounts of the inten- 
tionality of sensation, showing how they both depart from Thomas Aquinas by trying 
to maintain a principle of immanence to the sensory process. In doing so, I show how 
they both reject the notion of an «agent sense», but develop very elaborate accounts of 
sensation while doing so. By comparing these thinkers, I show that the two traditions 
of Aristotelianism they represent have a closer affinity than is usually thought to be 
the case. In addition, it becomes easier to see the milieu in which Descartes develops 
his own account of sensory experience and mind/body dualism.
Keywords: Francisco Suárez, Jacopo Zabarella, Thomas Aquinas, Intentionality, 
Sensation
I due filosofi del XVI secolo, Francisco Suarez e Jacopo Zabarella, sono stati rara­
mente accomunati rappresentando due filoni (diversi) del pensiero aristotelico: quel­
lo scolastico e quello padovano. In questo saggio, prendendo in considerazione la 
loro teoria dell’intenzionalità della sensazione, dimostro che tutt’e due si scostano da 
Tommaso d’Aquino, nel tentativo di mantenere il principio di immanenza al proces­
so sensoriale. Dimostrerò, quindi, che tutt’e due rifiutando la nozione di un «agente 
sensoriale», sviluppano teorie della sensazione molto elaborate. Confrontando questi 
filosofi dimostro, altresì, che le due tradizioni di aristotelismo, che essi rappresentano, 
hanno più affinità di quel che normalemente si pensi. Inoltre si può scorgere più facil­
mente l’ambiente in cui Descartes sviluppa la sua teoria dell’esperienza sensoriale e 
del dualismo mente-corpo.
Parole chiave: Francisco Suárez, Jacopo Zabarella, Tomaso d’Aquino, Intenzion- 
ality, Sensation
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